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ABSTRACT
Tunnelling   is   defined   as   the   transfer   of  assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their
controlling   shareholders.  We describe the various forms that   tunnelling   can   take,   and   examine   under   what
circumstances   it   is   legal.   We discuss two important legal principles -- the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty   --   which   courts   use   to   analyze   cases   involving   tunnelling.   Several important legal cases from France,
Belgium, and Italy illustrate how   and   why   the   law   accommodates   tunnelling in civil law countries, and why
certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.  
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The emerging markets crisis of 1997-1998 offers many instances of looting of firms by
their controlling shareholders.  Assets were transferred out of  companies, profits syphoned off  to
escape creditors, and troubled firms in a group propped up using loan guarantees by other listed
group members.  Johnson et al. (2000) show that countries whose legal systems restrict such
looting of firms more effectively had milder financial crises in 1997-1998.  In this paper, we use
the term tunnelling, coined originally to characterize the expropriation of minority shareholders in
the Czech Republic (as in removing assets through an underground tunnel), to describe the
transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them. 
We take on several questions about tunnelling.  Does it occur only in emerging markets,
with their generally poor law enforcement, or does it also happen in developed countries?  Is it
possible to tunnel a company legally?   What forms does legal tunnelling take?  Finally,  how does
the law in countries with good law enforcement accommodate tunnelling?
These questions bear on recent research showing that legal protection of minority
shareholders and creditors is an empirically significant determinant of financial development
across countries (La Porta et al. 1997).   This research also shows that company law in civil law
countries, especially French civil law countries, is less protective of minority shareholders than
that in common law countries (La Porta et al. 1998).  In this paper, we focus specifically on the
legal treatment of minority shareholders in different legal systems with respect to tunnelling. 
Using well-known cases from France, Italy, and Belgium, we show how legal tunnelling
happens in developed civil law countries .  We focus on French civil law countries, although cases
from German civil law countries indicate similar problems.  We present three judicial decisions,
which legal experts and textbooks view as indicative of situations in the respective countries,3
where courts allowed substantial expropriation of minority shareholders.  Courts did so not
through neglect or incompetence, but using specific legal logic.  By focusing on advanced market
economies, and on tunnelling which was explicitly blessed by courts, we show that tunnelling
occurs in countries with effective law enforcement and not just in emerging markets. 
1. How the courts allow tunnelling.    
We use the term tunnelling narrowly to refer to the transfer of resources out of a company
to its controlling shareholder (who is typically also a top manager).  Most public companies in
Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America have such controlling shareholders (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999).  As we use the term, tunnelling does not cover other
agency problems, such as incompetent management, placement of relatives in executive  positions,
excessive or insufficient investment, or resistance to value-increasing takeovers.  
Tunnelling comes in two forms.  First, a controlling shareholder can simply transfer
resources from the firm for his own benefit through self-dealing transactions.  Such transactions 
include outright theft or fraud, which are illegal everywhere though often go undetected or
unpunished, but also asset sales, contracts such as transfer pricing advantageous to the controlling
shareholder, excessive executive compensation, loan guarantees, expropriation of corporate
opportunities, and so on.  Second, the controlling shareholder can increase his share of the firm
without transferring any assets through dilutive share issues, minority freezeouts, insider trading,
creeping acquisitions, or other financial transactions that discriminate against minorities.  Here we
focus primarily on the first kind of tunnelling, but mention the second at the end.  
The  laws of most countries prohibit certain kinds of tunnelling.   In assessing conduct, 4
courts generally use  two broad principles, which appear in all major legal systems.  The first is
duty of care, which in this context refers to the responsibilities of corporate directors (and apply
to controlling shareholders in so far as they also serve as directors).  The duty of care, derived
from the Roman concept of  mandatum, requires a director to act as a reasonable, prudent, or
rational person would act in his position.  In most countries, courts implement the duty of care
using the “business judgment rule,” which gives directors the benefit of the doubt when conflicts
of interest are absent unless the plaintiffs demonstrate willfulness or  negligence on the directors’
part.   In the U.S., for example, courts rely on the business judgement rule to protect transactions
that provide nonmonetary benefits to insiders at the expense of outside shareholders (e.g., empire
building), decisions on executive compensation that are approved by a majority of disinterested
shareholders, and most takeover defenses.  Not surprisingly, these are the areas where the abuse
of minority shareholders in the U.S. is perceived to be significant.
The second general principle is the duty of loyalty, or fiduciary duty, which addresses
specifically situations with conflict of interest.  This duty requires that insiders do not profit at the
expense of shareholders, or of the corporation as the case may be depending on whom they legally
owe loyalty to.  The duty of care may allow a transaction that benefits insiders at the expense of
outside shareholders unless the latter can show that it does not have a legitimate business purpose
and that its sole intent is expropriation.  The duty of loyalty, in contrast, may statutorily rule out
such self-serving conduct or invite the court to examine its fairness.
In common law countries, the duties of loyalty and care are associated with very different
standards of proof.  “In the case of duty of care, there must be a requirement for exercising a
certain amount of care and when a director fails to exercise such care, he is considered guilty of5
negligence, whereas in the case of fiduciary duty, the very fact that the interests of a director are
in conflict with those of the company itself constitutes the basis for liability, and if the interests of
the company are prejudiced as a result of such conflict, liability for breach of fiduciary duty
arises…”(Shibuya 1972, p. 127). 
A further obstacle for a plaintiff attempting to prevail under the duty of care is the absence
of a simple rule (e.g., maximize profits) to characterize the behavior of a “rational” manager.  In
the U.S., the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors resisting a hostile takeover bid are
protected by the business judgement rule if they show a threat to the “corporation” by considering
the impact on “…creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally”
(Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.).  The interests of stakeholders play an even larger role in
some Continental European countries (e.g., Germany) where insiders are not only allowed to take
into account the interests of stakeholders but  must do so.   In fact, in many Continental European
countries the interests of stakeholders are allowed to weigh in even in standard self-dealing cases. 
Of course, shareholders are less likely to obtain remedy where conflicts of interests are assessed
through the lens of stakeholders.
There is another important difference between civil and common law countries. Regulating
self-dealing behavior involves a basic trade-off between legal predictability and fairness.  Civil law
countries emphasize the predictability of the law and rely on statutory rules to govern self-dealing
behavior.  They do so even though the formal statutory rules that are consistent with legal
certainty may invite insiders to creatively structure unfair transactions so as to conform to the
letter of the law.  In contrast, common law countries emphasize the notion of fairness and, as a
result, the “…general fiduciary duty of loyalty is a residual concept that can include situations that6
no one has foreseen and categorized.  The general duty permits, and in fact has led to, a
continuous evolution in corporate law” (Clark 1986, p. 141).  Precisely because the common law
notion of fiduciary duty is associated with a high level of judicial discretion to assess the terms of
transactions and to make rules, it is at odds with the civil law emphasis on legal certainty.  As a
consequence, while civil law courts in developed countries can stop outright theft and fraud
through the application of statutes, they find it more difficult to stop self-dealing transactions with
a plausible business purpose. 
A clear example of the reluctance of courts in civil law countries to broadly apply the
principle of fairness to corporate directors comes from Japan.  After the war, the Americans
introduced the concept of the duty of loyalty of directors into Japanese corporate law.  However,
“in considering whether there has been a conflict of interest, the Japanese courts have shied away
from attempting any detailed analysis of the case... While it is clear that the American draftsman
intended to import into Japanese law principles that would be recognized by any common law
lawyer as involving essentially fiduciary standards, this is certainly not the way in which the
Japanese judiciary has proceeded.  Their approach has been very much on the basis of commercial
law and fair dealing rather than the need to eschew breaches of stewardship.  Consequently, the
law in Japan is very much more formal and, therefore, inflexible than in its common law
counterparts” (Nakajima 1999, p. 51).
In sum, courts in civil law countries may accommodate more tunnelling than courts in
common law countries because of: 1) a narrower application of the duty of loyalty largely to
transactions with no business purpose, 2) a higher standard of proof in conflict of interest
situations, 3) a greater responsiveness to stakeholder interests, and 4) a greater reliance on7
statutes rather than fairness to regulate self-dealing transactions. 
2.  Cases on Tunnelling. 
In this section, we discuss several well-known cases of tunnelling in Western European
countries, which are generally taken by legal scholars as indicative of how the courts see the law.
SARL Peronnet (Corporate Opportunities; Schmidt 1999). SAICO, a minority
shareholder of SARL Peronnet, a French company controlled by the Peronnet family, sued the
directors from the Peronnet family.  The Peronnet family established a new company, SCI, solely
owned by family members.  SCI bought some land and took out a loan to build a warehouse.  SCI
then leased the warehouse to SARL Peronnet, which expanded its business, and used the
proceeds to repay the loan.  The plaintiff argued that the Peronnet family expropriated the
corporate opportunity of SARL Peronnet (namely to build a warehouse), and thereby benefitted
itself at the expense of minority shareholders. 
The court ruled against SAICO, on two grounds.  First, it held that the decision by
Peronnet to pay SCI to warehouse its products was not against the social interest, as evidenced by
the fact that sales of SARL Peronnet expanded during this period.  Second, the court held that
SARL Peronnet’s expansion had benefitted SAICO as well.   It could thus be argued that the
decision to build a warehouse through SCI was not taken with the  sole intention of benefitting the
majority shareholders (i.e., the Peronnet family), and had a legitimate business purpose.  Under
French law, this was sufficient to rule against SAICO.  The court took no interest in the questions
of whether the creation of SCI, and the prices it charged SARL Peronnet for the use of the
warehouse, were fair to SAICO and other minority shareholders.  The court took a very particular8
interpretation of the effect of the deal on the minority shareholders of SARL Peronnet: as long as
they have not suffered an actual loss, the business judgment rule protected the Peronnet family. 
In the U.S. and the U.K., courts would be very suspicious of the conduct of the Peronnet family
unless it could demonstrate that it closely mimicked an arms-length transaction through an
independent valuation of the lease and/or approval by independent directors. 
Marcilli (Transfer Pricing; Stanghellini 1997).   Marcilli, an Italian machinery maker, was
51% owned by its controlling shareholder, Sarcem, a Swiss machinery maker, and 49% owned by
two minority shareholders, Mr. Anguissola and Mr. Mignani (the plaintiffs), who sat on the board. 
 Mr. Bonello, the President and CEO of Sarcem, also became President of Marcilli in 1982.  
Shortly afterwards, the plaintiffs resigned from the board, and sued Sarcem.  They demanded a
court inspection and intervention, since the absence of derivative suits made it impossible for
minority shareholders to seek damages without the consent of Sarcem.  The plaintiffs alleged that
Sarcem, among other things: 1) precluded Marcilli from exporting its products directly, requiring
that they only be sold through Sarcem; 2) charged too high a markup for Marcilli products it
resold, compromising Marcilli’s market share and pocketing short term profits; 3) sold and
exhibited Marcilli products under its own trademark; 4) overcharged Marcilli for the services it
provided such as costs of participating in international fairs; and 5) did not pay Marcilli for its
goods on time. 
The court declined to appoint a judicial investigator since it found that the influence
exerted by the majority shareholder was consistent with a  group policy, and therefore a well-
defined and explicit business discipline could not be excluded.  In deciding for Sarcem, the court
focused on the duty of care, with two further twists favoring the defendant.  First, the duty of Mr.9
Bonello, Marcilli’s President, was to the group including Sarcem rather than to the shareholders
of Marcilli.  Second, since the issues involved day-to-day business transactions as opposed to
explicit board decisions, none of the statutory rules governing conflicts of interest kicked in, since
these rules only apply to resolutions of collective organs (shareholders’ meetings or boards of
directors).  Again, no fairness test was used, and the court sanctioned tunnelling from a company
to its controlling shareholder through transfer pricing.  
Flambo and Barro (The Plunder of Barro; Wymeersch 1993)  A French firm, Flambo,
was the controlling shareholder in a Belgian company, Barro.  Several significant minority
shareholders of Barro (the plaintiffs) sued Flambo arguing that it literally stripped Barro of its
assets, and demanded judicial intervention and remedies.  The plaintiffs argued that Flambo: 1)
tried to pledge Barro (i.e., the whole company) as collateral to guarantee Flambo’s debt; 2) forced
Barro to acquire all of the new shares of Flambo in a capital increase; 3) withdrew a substantial
sum from Barro’s accounts without subsequent repayment; 4) diverted an important contract with
Rank Xerox from Barro to Flambo; and 5) made use of the utilities belonging to Barro without
paying for them.  
Since Belgium has no statutory rules relating to intergroup transactions, the court relied
on the business judgment rule, and held that Flambo’s conduct was consistent with the interest of
the group as a whole.  The court pointed out that, in principle, it was not objectionable for a
subsidiary to support its parent as long as the subsidiary itself was not in danger of bankruptcy. 
Fairness to the minority shareholders of Barro did not come up in the ruling and while the court
disallowed Flambo to continue transferring resources from Barro without judicial review, it did
not propose any remedies for past expropriation or even a change in Barro’s board.  As in the10
previous case, the court took a broad view of the interests of the group rather than the subsidiary
company, and therefore (up to a limit) saw no problem with the tunnelling of resources out of a
subsidiary to the controlling shareholder.  
In addition to tunnelling assets, profits, or corporate opportunities, the controlling
shareholder can expropriate minority shareholders through financial transactions, such as diluting
their stakes through a closed subscription to new shares.  Such transactions are relatively common
in emerging markets, such as Russia.  In Western Europe, the forms of financial expropriation are
subtler.  In one German case, a company avoided honoring its minority shareholders’ preemptive
right to a new issue of equity by raising capital in kind.  In another famous case, Volkswagen, the
controlling (75%) shareholder of Audi, bought out a small equity stake of a minority shareholder
in Audi for DM 145 per share.  The price was based on a valuation provided by VW.  Two weeks
later, VW bought out a very large (14%) stake in Audi from the British-Israeli Bank for DM 220
per share.  The German Supreme Court refused to hear the complaint from the small shareholder
on the grounds that the controlling shareholder did not owe any duties of good faith or loyalty to
the minority shareholders.  The court also agreed that VW was under no obligation to reveal its
negotiations with the British-Israeli Bank because such a revelation might have negatively affected
the valuation of VW’s shares.  
3.  Conclusion. 
In this paper, we use legal cases to establish four propositions.   First, even in developed
countries, tunnelling - the diversion of corporate resources from the corporation (or its minority
shareholders) to the controlling shareholder - can be substantial.11
Second, much of the tunnelling is legal, i.e. consistent with both the statutes and the basic
principles followed by judges.  Although some tunnelling (especially in emerging markets) takes
the form of  theft or fraud, legal tunnelling takes place in developed countries as well. 
Third, such legal tunnelling takes a variety of forms, including expropriation of corporate
opportunities from a firm by its controlling shareholder, transfer pricing favoring the controlling
shareholder, transfer of assets from a firm to its controlling shareholder at non-market prices, loan
guarantees using the firm’s assets as collateral, and so on. Tunnelling can also take the form of
financial as opposed to real transactions -- dilution of minorities being the leading example.
Finally, we identified some potential differences between civil and common law countries
in how courts approach tunnelling cases.  In civil law countries, the expropriation of minority
shareholders by the controlling shareholder in a transaction with a plausible business purpose is
often seen as consistent with directors’ duties, especially if the controlling shareholder is another
firm in the group.  Self-dealing transactions are assessed in light of their conformity with statutes
and not on the basis of their fairness to minorities.  In contrast, fairness to minority shareholders
as a broad principle going beyond statutes is central to the analysis of self-dealing transactions by
common law courts, and the burden of proof in such cases is favorable to outside shareholders. 
(Perhaps the reason that pyramidal group structures are relatively rare in the U.S. and the U.K.  is
that many transactions inside a group would be challenged on fairness grounds by minority
shareholders of subsidiaries, who would get a receptive hearing in court.)  
These findings are broadly consistent with a growing body of research suggesting that civil
law countries are less protective of minority shareholders than are common law countries. 
Moreover, these findings suggest yet again that it is the laws themselves, and the ways in which12
the courts apply them, that matter for real outcomes, including the extent of tunnelling.  The
earlier research (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998 and Johnson and Shleifer 1999) has focused on statutes
in describing the differences in legal systems.  Here we find that, in addition, the application of
general principles such as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty by courts may influence how
firms in different countries organize and finance themselves. 
One can argue, of course, that while these elements of legal systems have stunted the
development of stock markets in advanced civil law countries, they have not had a major effect on
economic development as these countries have found substitute mechanisms of limiting
expropriation and financing firms.  This is surely true to some extent.  Two points, however, are
worth stressing.  First, in recent years, the advanced civil law countries -- encouraged in part by a
technology boom and in part by the flow of funds from foreign investors -- have found it
attractive to promote stock market financing for new firms via legal reform.  The creation of
Neuer Markt in Germany and Nouveau Marché in France, with their greater protection of
minority shareholders, illustrates this policy (Johnson 1999).  Second, for less developed
countries, including those that suffered from the Asian crisis, the failure of the legal system may
be very costly precisely because it accommodates vast amounts of tunnelling.  Using legal reform
to reduce tunnelling is then a crucial element of promoting financial and economic development.13
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